Gradient Perturbation is Underrated for Differentially Private Convex
  Optimization by Yu, Da et al.
GRADIENT PERTURBATION IS UNDERRATED FOR
DIFFERENTIALLY PRIVATE CONVEX OPTIMIZATION
A PREPRINT
Da Yu∗ †
Sun Yat-sen University, Guangzhou, China
yuda3@mail2.sysu.edu.cn
Huishuai Zhang∗
Microsoft Research, Beijing, China
Huishuai.Zhang@microsoft.com
Wei Chen
Microsoft Research, Beijing, China
wche@microsoft.com
Tie-Yan Liu
Microsoft Research, Beijing, China
tie-yan.liu@microsoft.com
Jian Yin
Sun Yat-sen University, Guangzhou, China
issjyin@mail.sysu.edu.cn
November 27, 2019
ABSTRACT
Gradient perturbation, widely used for differentially private optimization, injects
noise at every iterative update to guarantee differential privacy. Previous work
first determines the noise level that can satisfy the privacy requirement and then
analyzes the utility of noisy gradient updates as in non-private case. In this paper,
we explore how the privacy noise affects the optimization property. We show
that for differentially private convex optimization, the utility guarantee of both
DP-GD and DP-SGD is determined by an expected curvature rather than the
minimum curvature. The expected curvature represents the average curvature over
the optimization path, which is usually much larger than the minimum curvature
and hence can help us achieve a significantly improved utility guarantee. By using
the expected curvature, our theory justifies the advantage of gradient perturbation
over other perturbation methods and closes the gap between theory and practice.
Extensive experiments on real world datasets corroborate our theoretical findings.
1 Introduction
Machine learning has become a powerful tool for many practical applications. The training process
often needs access to some private dataset, e.g., applications in financial and medical fields. Recent
work has shown that the model learned from training data may leak unintended information of
individual records (Fredrikson et al., 2015; Wu et al., 2016; Shokri et al., 2017; Hitaj et al., 2017).
It is known that Differential privacy (DP) (Dwork et al., 2006a;b) is a golden standard for privacy
preserving data analysis. It provides provable privacy guarantee by ensuring the influence of any
individual record is negligible. It has been deployed into real world applications by large-scale
corporations and U.S. Census Bureau (Erlingsson et al., 2014; McMillan, 2016; Abowd, 2016; Ding
et al., 2017).
∗The first two authors contribute equally to this work.
†The work was done when the first author was an intern at Microsoft Research Asia.
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We study the fundamental problem when differential privacy meets machine learning: the differentially
private empirical risk minimization (DP-ERM) problem (Chaudhuri & Monteleoni, 2009; Chaudhuri
et al., 2011; Kifer et al., 2012; Bassily et al., 2014; Talwar et al., 2015; Wu et al., 2017; Zhang
et al., 2017; Wang et al., 2017; Smith et al., 2017; Jayaraman et al., 2018; Feldman et al., 2018;
Iyengar et al., 2019; Wang & Gu, 2019). DP-ERM minimizes the empirical risk while guaranteeing
that the output of learning algorithm is differentially private with respect to the training data. Such
privacy guarantee provides strong protection against potential adversaries (Hitaj et al., 2017; Rahman
et al., 2018). In order to guarantee privacy, it is necessary to introduce randomness to the algorithm.
There are usually three ways to introduce randomness according to the time of adding noise: output
perturbation, objective perturbation and gradient perturbation.
Output perturbation (Wu et al., 2017; Zhang et al., 2017) first runs the learning algorithm the same as
in the non-private case then adds noise to the output parameter. Objective perturbation (Chaudhuri
et al., 2011; Kifer et al., 2012; Iyengar et al., 2019) perturbs the objective (i.e., the empirical loss)
then release the minimizer of the perturbed objective. Gradient perturbation (Song et al., 2013;
Bassily et al., 2014; Abadi et al., 2016; Wang et al., 2017; Lee & Kifer, 2018; Jayaraman et al., 2018)
perturbs each intermediate update. If each update is differentially private, the composition theorem of
differential privacy ensures the whole learning procedure is differentially private.
Gradient perturbation comes with several advantages over output/objective perturbations. Firstly,
gradient perturbation does not require strong assumption on the objective because it only needs to
bound the sensitivity of gradient update rather than the whole learning process. Secondly, gradient
perturbation can release the noisy gradient at each iteration without damaging the privacy guarantee
as differential privacy is immune to post processing (Dwork et al., 2014). Thus, it is a more favorable
choice for certain applications such as distributed optimization (Rajkumar & Agarwal, 2012; Agarwal
et al., 2018; Jayaraman et al., 2018). At last, gradient perturbation often achieves better empirical
utility than output/objective perturbations for DP-ERM.
However, the existing theoretical utility guarantee for gradient perturbation is the same as or strictly
inferior to that of other perturbation methods as shown in Table 1. This motivates us to ask
“What is wrong with the theory for gradient perturbation? Can we justify the empirical advantage of
gradient perturbation theoretically?”
We revisit the analysis for gradient perturbation approach. Previous work (Bassily et al., 2014; Wang
et al., 2017; Jayaraman et al., 2018) derive the utility guarantee of gradient perturbation via two steps.
They first determine the noise variance at each step that meets the privacy requirement and then derive
the utility guarantee by using the convergence analysis the same as in non-private case. However, the
noise to guarantee privacy naturally affects the optimization procedure, but previous approach does
not exploit the interaction between privacy noise and optimization of gradient perturbation.
In this paper, we utilize the fact the privacy noise affects the optimization procedure and establish
new and much tighter utility guarantees for gradient perturbation approaches. Our contribution can
be summarized as follows.
• We introduce an expected curvature that can characterize the optimization property accu-
rately when there is perturbation noise at each gradient update.
• We establish the utility guarantees for DP-GD for both convex and strongly convex objectives
based on the expected curvature rather than the usual minimum curvature.
• We also establish the the utility guarantees for DP-SGD for both convex and strongly convex
objectives based on the expected curvature. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first
work to remove the dependency on minimum curvature for DP-ERM algorithms.
In DP-ERM literature, there is a gap between the utility guarantee of non-strongly convex objectives
and that of strongly convex objectives. However, by using the expected curvature, we show that some
of the non-strongly convex objectives can achieve the same order of utility guarantee as the strongly
convex objectives, matching the empirical observation. This is because the expected curvature could
be relatively large even for non-strongly convex objectives.
As we mentioned earlier, prior to our work, there is a mismatch between theoretical guarantee
and empirical observation of gradient perturbation approach compared with other two perturbation
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Table 1: Expected excess empirical risk bounds under (, δ)-DP, where n and p are the number of
samples and the number of parameters, respectively, and β, µ and ν are the smooth coefficient, the
strongly convex coefficient and the expected curvature, respectively, and ν ≥ µ (see Section 3.1). We
note that µ = 0 denotes the convex but not strongly convex objective. The Lipschitz constant L is
assumed to be 1. We omit log (1/δ) for simplicity.
Authors Perturbation Algorithm Utility (µ = 0) Utility (µ > 0)
Chaudhuri et al. (2011) Objective N/A O
(√
p
n
)
O
(
p
µn22
)
Zhang et al. (2017) Output GD O
(
(
√
βp
n )
2/3
)
O
(
βp
µ2n22
)
Bassily et al. (2014) Gradient SGD O
(√
p log3/2(n)
n
)
O
(
p log2(n)
µn22
)
Jayaraman et al. (2018) Gradient GD N/A O
(
βp log2(n)
µ2n22
)
Ours Gradient GD O
(√
p
n ∧ βp log(n)ν2n22
)
O
(
βp log(n)
ν2n22
)
Ours Gradient SGD O
(√
p log(n)
n ∧ p log(n)νn22
)
O
(
p log(n)
νn22
)
approaches. Our result theoretically justifies the advantage of gradient perturbation and close the
mismatch.
1.1 Paper Organization
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces notations and the DP-ERM task.
In Sections 3, we first introduce the expected curvature and establish the utility guarantee of both
DP-GD and DP-SGD based on such expected curvature. Then we give some discussion on three
perturbation approaches. We conduct extensive experiments in Section 4. Finally, we conclude in
Section 5.
2 Preliminary
We introduce notations and definitions in this section. Given dataset D = {d1, . . . , dn}, the objective
function F (x;D) is defined as F (x;D) =∆ 1n
∑n
i=1 f(x; di), where f(x; di) : Rp → R is the loss
of model x ∈ Rp for the record di.
For simplicity, we use F (x) to denote F (x;D). We use ‖v‖ to denote the l2 norm of a vector v. We
use X ∗f = arg minx∈Rp f(x) to denote the set of optimal solutions of f(x). Throughout this paper,
we assume X ∗f non-empty.
Definition 1 (Objective properties). For any x,y ∈ Rp , a function f : Rp → R
• is L-Lipschitz if |f(x)− f(y)| ≤ L ‖x− y‖.
• is β-smooth if f(y) ≤ f(x) + 〈∇f(x),y − x〉+ β2 ‖y − x‖2.
• is convex if 〈∇f(x)−∇f(y),x− y〉 ≥ 0.
• is µ-strongly convex (or µ-SC) if 〈∇f(x)−∇f(y),x− y〉 ≥ µ ‖x− y‖2.
The strong convexity coefficient µ is the lower bound of the minimum curvature of function f over
the domain.
We say that two datasets D,D′ are neighboring datasets (denoted as D ∼ D′) if D can be obtained
by arbitrarily modifying one record in D′ (or vice versa). In this paper we consider (, δ)-differential
privacy as follows.
Definition 2 ( (, δ)-DP (Dwork et al., 2006a;b)). A randomized mechanismM : D → R guarantees
(, δ)-differential privacy if for any two neighboring input datasetsD,D
′
and for any subset of outputs
S ⊆ R it holds that Pr[M(D) ∈ S] ≤ ePr[M(D′) ∈ S] + δ.
3
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We note that δ can be viewed as the probability that original -DP fails and a meaningful setting
requires δ  1n . By its definition, differential privacy controls the maximum influence that any
individual record can produce. Smaller , δ implies less information leak but usually leads to worse
utility. One can adjust , δ to trade off between privacy and utility.
DP-ERM requires the output xout ∈ Rp is differentially private with respect to the input dataset D.
Let x∗ ∈ X ∗F be one of the optimal solutions of F (x), the utility of DP-ERM algorithm is measured
by expected excess empirical risk: E[F (xout) − F (x∗)], where the expectation is taken over the
algorithm randomness.
3 Main Results
In this section, we first define the expected curvature ν and explain why it depends only on the
average curvature. We then use such expected curvature to improve the analysis of both DP-SGD and
DP-GD.
3.1 Expected Curvature
In non-private setting, the analysis of convex optimization relies on the strongly convex coefficient
µ, which is the minimum curvature over the domain and can be extremely small for some common
objectives. Previous work on DP-ERM uses the same analysis as in non-private case and therefore
the resulting utility bounds rely on the minimum curvature. In our analysis, however, we avoid the
dependency on the minimum curvature by exploiting how the privacy noise affects the optimization.
With the perturbation noise, the expected curvature that the optimization path encounters is related to
the average curvature instead of the minimum curvature. Definition 3 uses ν to capture such average
curvature with Gaussian noise. We use x∗ = arg minx∈X∗ ‖x− x1‖ to denote the closest solution
to the initial point.
Definition 3 (Expected curvature). A convex function F : Rp → R, has expected curvature ν with
respect to noise N (0, σ2Ip) if for any x ∈ Rp and x˜ = x− z where z ∼ N (0, σ2Ip), it holds that
E[〈∇F (x˜), x˜− x∗〉] ≥ νE[‖x˜− x∗‖2], (1)
where the expectation is taken with respect to z.
Claim 1. If F is µ-strongly convex, we have ν ≥ µ.
Proof. It can be verified that ν = µ always holds because of the strongly convex definition.
In fact, ν represents the average curvature and is much larger than µ. We use x′ to denote the
transpose of x. Let Hx = ∇2F (x) be the Hessian matrix evaluated at x. We use Taylor expansion
to approximate the left hand side of Eq (1) as follows
E[〈∇F (x˜), x˜− x∗〉] ≈ E[〈∇F (x)−Hxz,x− z − x∗〉]
= 〈∇F (x),x− x∗〉+ E[z′Hxz]
= 〈∇F (x),x− x∗〉+ σ2 tr(Hx).
For convex objective, the Hessian matrix is positive semi-definite and tr(Hx) is the sum of the
eigenvalues of Hx. We can further express out the right hand side of Eq (1) as follows
E[‖x˜− x∗‖2] = E[‖x− z − x∗‖2] = ν
(
‖x− x∗‖2 + pσ2
)
.
Based on the above approximation, we can estimate the value of ν in Definition 3: ν .
tr(Hx)σ
2+µ‖x−x∗‖2
pσ2+‖x−x∗‖2 . For relatively large σ
2, this implies ν ≈ tr(Hx)p that is the average curva-
ture at x. Large variance is a reasonable setting because meaningful differential privacy guarantee
requires non-trivial amount of noise.
The above analysis suggests that ν can be independent of and much larger than µ. This is indeed true
for many convex objectives. Let us take the l2 regularized logistic regression as an example. The
objective is strongly convex only due to the l2 regularizer. Thus, the minimum curvature (strongly
convex coefficient) is the regularization coefficient λ. Sharmir et al. [1] shows the optimal choice
4
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Figure 1: Curvatures of regularized logis-
tic regression on Adult dataset over train-
ing. Dot/cross symbol represents aver-
age/minimum curvature respectively.
Figure 2: Illustration of a generic loss func-
tion in the high dimensional setting (p>n, Fig-
ure 3 in Negahban et al. (2012)).
of λ is Θ(n−1/2) (Section 4.3 in [1]). In practice, typical choice of λ is even smaller and could
be on the order of n−1. Figure 1 compares the minimum and average curvatures of regularized
logistic regression during the training process. The average curvature is basically unaffected by the
regularization term λ. In contrast, the minimum curvature reaches λ in first few steps. Therefore
removing the dependence on minimum curvature is a significant improvement. We also plot the
curvatures for another dataset KDDCup99 in the Appendix C. The resulting curvatures are similar to
Figure 1.
Perturbation noise is necessary to attain ν > µ. We note that ν = µwhen the training process does
not involve perturbation noise (corresponding to σ = 0 in Definition 3). For example, objective/output
perturbation cannot utilize this expected curvature condition as no noise is injected in their training
process. Therefore, among three existing perturbation methods, gradient perturbation is the only
method can leverage such effect of noise.
We note that µ = 0 does not necessarily lead to ν = 0. A concrete example is given in Figure 2
(from Negahban et al. (2012)). It provides an illustration of the loss function in the high-dimensional
(p > n) setting, i.e., the resticted strongly convex scenario: the loss is curved in certain directions
but completely flat in others. The average curvature of such objective is always positive but the
worst curvature is 0. Though some recent work shows the utility guarantee of high dimensional
DP-ERM task may not depend on the worst curvature (Wang & Gu, 2019), Figure 2 still provides
a good illustration for the case of ν > µ = 0. Moreover, as shown in Figure 1, the average
curvature of logistic regression on Adult dataset is above 0 during the training procedure even the
regularization term is 0. As we will show later, a positive ν over the optimization path is sufficient
for our optimization analysis.
3.2 Utility Guarantee of DP-GD Based on Expected Curvature
In this section we show that the expected curvature can be used to improve the utility bound of
DP-GD (Algorithm 1).
Algorithm 1: Differentially Private Gradient Descent (DP-GD)
Input: Privacy parameters , δ; running steps T ; learning rate η. Loss function F (x) with
Lipschitz constant L.
for t = 1 to T do
Compute gt = ∇F (xt).
Update parameter xt+1 = xt − ηt (gt + zt), where zt ∼ N
(
0, σ2t Ip
)
.
end for
Algorithm 1 is (, δ)-DP if we set σt = Θ
(
L
√
T log(1/δ)
n
)
(Jayaraman et al., 2018). Let x1, . . . ,xT
be the training path and ν = min{ν1, . . . , νT } be the minimum expected curvature over the path.
Now we present the utility guarantee of DP-GD for the case of ν > 0 .
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Theorem 1 (Utility guarantee, ν > 0.). Suppose F is L-Lipschitz and β-smooth with ν expected
curvature. Set η ≤ 1β , T = 2 log(n)ην and σt = Θ
(
L
√
T log(1/δ)/n
)
, we have
E[F (xT+1)− F (x∗)] = O
(
βp log (n)L2 log (1/δ)
ν2n22
)
.
Proof. All proofs in this paper are relegated to Appendix A.
Remark 1. Theorem 3 only depends on the expected curvature over the training path ν.
The expectation is taken over the algorithm randomness if without specification. Theorem 1 signifi-
cantly improves the original analysis of DP-GD because of our arguments in Section 3.1. If ν = 0,
then the curvatures are flatten in all directions. One example is the linear function, which is used by
Bassily et al. (2014) to derive their utility lower bound. Such simple function may not be commonly
used as loss function in practice. Nonetheless, we give the utility guarantee for the case of ν = 0 in
Theorem 2.
Theorem 2 (Utility guarantee, ν = 0.). Suppose F is L-Lipschitz and β-smooth. Set η = 1β ,
T = nβ√p and σt = Θ
(
L
√
T log(1/δ)/n
)
. Let x¯ = 1T
∑T
i=1 xi+1, we have
E[F (x¯)− F (x∗)] = O
(√
pL2 log (1/δ)
n
)
.
We use parameter averaging to reduce the influence of perturbation noise because gradient update
does not have strong contraction effect when ν = 0.
3.3 Utiltiy Guarantee of DP-SGD Based on Expected Curvature
Stochastic gradient descent has become one of the most popular optimization methods because of the
cheap one-iteration cost. In this section we show that expected curvature can also improve the utility
analysis for DP-SGD (Algorithm 2). We note that∇f(x) represents an element from the subgradient
set evaluated at x when the objective is not smooth. Before stating our theorem, we introduce the
moments accountant technique (Lemma 1) that is essential to establish privacy guarantee.
Lemma 1 (Abadi et al. (2016)). There exist constants c1 and c2 so that given running steps T , for any
 < c1T/n
2, Algorithm 2 is (, δ)-differentially private for any δ > 0 if we choose σ ≥ c2
√
Tlog(1/δ)
n .
Algorithm 2: Differentially Private Stochastic Gradient Descent (DP-SGD)
Input :Dataset D = {d1, . . . , dn}. Individual loss function: fi (x) = f (x; di) with Lipschitz
constant L. Number of iterations: T . Learning rate: ηt.
1 for t = 1 to T do
2 Sample it from [n] uniformly.
3 Compute gt = ∇fit (xt).
4 Update parameter xt+1 = xt − ηt (gt + zt), where zt ∼ N
(
0, L2σ2Ip
)
.
5 end
For the case of ν > 0, Theorem 3 presents the utility guarantee of DP-SGD.
Theorem 3 (Utility guarantee, ν > 0.). Suppose F is L-Lipschitz with ν expected curvature. Choose
σ based on Lemma 1 to guarantee (, δ)-DP. Set ηt = 1νt and T = n
22, we have
E[F (xT )− F (x∗)] = O
(
pL2 log (n) log (1/δ)
n22ν
)
.
Remark 2. Theorem 3 does not require smooth assumption.
Theorem 3 shows the utility guarantee of DP-SGD also depends on ν rather than µ. We set T = Θ(n2)
following Bassily et al. (2014). We note that T = Θ(n2) is necessary even for non-private SGD to
reach 1/n2 precision. We next show for a relatively coarse precision, the running time can be reduced
significantly.
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Theorem 4. Suppose F is L-Lipschitz with ν expected curvature. Choose σ based on Lemma 1 to
guarantee (, δ)-DP. Set ηt = 1νt and T =
n√
p . Suppose p < n
2, we have
E[F (xT )− F (x∗)] = O
(√
pL2 log(n)
nν
)
.
We note that the analysis of Bassily et al. (2014) yields E[F (xT )− F (x∗)] = O
(√
pL2 log2(n)
nµ
)
if
setting T = n√p , which still depends on the minimum curvature. Theorem 5 shows the utility for the
case of ν = 0.
Theorem 5 (Utility guarantee, ν = 0.). Suppose F is L-Lipschitz. Assume ‖xt‖ ≤ D for t ∈ [T ].
Choose σ based on Lemma 1 to guarantee (, δ)-DP. Let G = L
√
1 + pσ2, set ηt = DG√t and
T = n22, we have
E[F (xT )− F (x∗)] = O
(√
p log (1/δ)L log (n)
n
)
.
This utility guarantee can be derived from Theorem 2 in (Shamir & Zhang, 2013).
3.4 Discussion on three perturbation approaches.
In this section, we briefly discuss two other perturbation approaches and compare them to the gradient
perturbation approach.
Output perturbation (Wu et al., 2017; Zhang et al., 2017) perturbs the learning algorithm after
training. It adds noise to the resulting model of non-private learning process. The magnitude of
perturbation noise is propositional to the maximum influence one record can cause on the learned
model. Take the gradient descent algorithm as an example. At each step, the gradient of different
records would diverge the two sets of parameters generated by neighboring datasets, the maximum
distance expansion is related to the Lipschitz coefficient. At the same time, the gradient of the same
records in two datasets would shrink the parameter distance because of the contraction effect of
the gradient update. The contraction effect depends on the smooth and strongly convex coefficient.
Smaller strongly convex coefficient leads to weaker contraction. The sensitivity of output perturbation
algorithm is the upper bound on the largest possible final distance between two sets of parameters.
Objective perturbation (Chaudhuri et al., 2011; Kifer et al., 2012; Iyengar et al., 2019) perturbs
the objective function before training. It requires the objective function to be strongly convex to
guarantee the uniqueness of the solution. It first adds L2 regularization to obtain strong convexity if
the original objective is not strongly convex. Then it perturbs the objective with a random linear term.
The sensitivity of objective perturbation is the maximum change of the minimizer that one record can
produce. Chaudhuri et al. (2011) and Kifer et al. (2012) use the largest and the smallest eigenvalue
(i.e. the smooth and strongly convex coefficient) of the objective’s Hessian matrix to upper bound
such change.
In comparison, gradient perturbation is more flexible than output/objective perturbation. For example,
to bound the sensitivity, gradient perturbation only requires Lipschitz coefficient which can be easily
obtained by using the gradient clipping technique. However, both output and objective perturbation
further need to compute the smooth coefficient, which is hard for some common objectives such as
softmax regression.
More critically, output/objective perturbation cannot utilize the expected curvature condition because
their training process does not contain perturbation noise. Moreover, they have to consider the worst
performance of learning algorithm. That is because DP makes the worst case assumption on query
function and output/objective perturbation treat the whole learning algorithm as a single query to
private dataset. This explains why their utility guarantee depends on the worst curvature of the
objective.
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Table 2: Algorithm validation accuracy (in %) on various kinds of real world datasets. Privacy
parameter  is 0.1 for binary dataset and 1 for multi-classes datasets.
KDDCup99 Adult MNIST Covertype Gisette Real-sim RCV1
Non private 99.1 84.8 91.9 71.2 96.6 93.3 93.5
AMP3 97.5 79.3 71.9 64.3 62.8 73.1 64.5
Out-SGD 98.1 77.4 69.4 62.4 62.3 73.2 66.7
DP-SGD 98.7 80.4 87.5 67.7 63.0 73.8 70.4
DP-GD 98.7 80.9 88.6 66.2 67.3 76.1 74.9
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Figure 3: Algorithm validation accuracy (in %) with varying . NP represents non-private baseline.
Detailed description about evaluated datasets can be found in Table 3.
4 Experiment
In this section, we evaluate the performance of DP-GD and DP-SGD on multiple real world datasets.
We use the benchmark datasets provided by Iyengar et al. (2019). Objective functions are logistic
regression and softmax regression for binary and multi-class datasets, respectively.
Datasets. The benchmark datasets includes two multi-class datasets (MNIST, Covertype) and five
binary datasets, and three of them are high dimensional (Gisette, Real-sim, RCV1). Following
Iyengar et al. (2019), we use 80% data for training and the rest for testing. Detailed description of
datasets can be found in Appendix B
Implementation details. We track Rényi differentialy privacy (RDP) (Mironov, 2017) and convert
it to (, δ)-DP. Running step T is chosen from {50, 200, 800} for both DP-GD and DP-SGD. For
DP-SGD, we use moments accountant to track the privacy loss and the sampling ratio is set as 0.1.
The standard deviation of the added noise σ is set to be the smallest value such that the privacy budget
is allowable to run desired steps. We ensure each loss function is Lipschitz by clipping individual
gradient. The method in Goodfellow (2015) allows us to clip individual gradient efficiently. Clipping
threshold is set as 1 (0.5 for high dimensional datasets because of the sparse gradient). For DP-GD,
learning rate is chosen from {0.1, 1.0, 5.0} ({0.2, 2.0, 10.0} for high dimensional datasets). The
learning rate of DP-SGD is twice as large as DP-GD and it is divided by 2 at the middle of training.
Privacy parameter δ is set as 1n2 . The l2 regularization coefficient is set as 1× 10−4. All reported
numbers are averaged over 20 runs.
Baseline algorithms. The baseline algorithms include state-of-the-art objective and output pertur-
bation algorithms. For objective perturbation, we use Approximate Minima Perturbation (AMP)
(Iyengar et al., 2019). For output perturbation, we use the algorithm in Wu et al. (2017) (Output
perturbation SGD). We adopt the implementation and hyperparameters in Iyengar et al. (2019) for
both algorithms. For multi-class classification tasks, Wu et al. (2017) and Iyengar et al. (2019)
divide the privacy budget evenly and train multiple binary classifiers because their algorithms need
to compute smooth coefficient before training and therefore are not directly applicable to softmax
regression.
Experiment results. The validation accuracy results for all evaluated algorithms with  = 0.1 (1.0
for multi-class datasets) are presented in Table 2. We also plot the accuracy results with varying
 in Figure 3. These results confirm our theory in Section 3: gradient perturbation achieves better
performance than other perturbation methods as it leverages the average curvature.
3For multi-class datas sets MNIST and Covertype, we use the numbers reported in Iyengar et al. (2019)
directly because of the long running time of AMP especially on multi-class datasets.
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5 Conclusion
In this paper, we show the privacy noise actually helps optimization analysis, which can be used
to improve the utility guarantee of both DP-GD and DP-SGD. Our result theoretically justifies
the empirical superiority of gradient perturbation over other methods and advance the state of the
art utility guarantee of DP-ERM algorithms. Experiments on real world datasets corroborate our
theoretical findings nicely. In the future, it is interesting to consider how to utilize the expected
curvature condition to improve the utility guarantee of other gradient perturbation based algorithms.
9
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Appendix A Proofs Related to DP-GD and DP-SGD
Proof of Theorem 1. Let x1, . . . ,xt be the path generated by optimization procedure. Since xt contains
Gaussian perturbation noise zt−1, Definition 3 gives us
Ezt−1 [〈xt − x∗,∇F (xt)〉] ≥ νtEzt−1 [‖xt − x∗‖2].
Since F is β-smooth, we have
〈xt − x∗,∇F (xt)〉 ≥ 1
β
‖∇F (xt)‖2 .
Take linear combination of above inequalities,
Ezt−1 [〈xt − x∗,∇F (xt)〉] ≥ θνtEzt−1 [‖xt − x∗‖2] +
(1− θ)
β
Ezt−1 [‖∇F (xt)‖2]
≥ θνEzt−1 [‖xt − x∗‖2] +
(1− θ)
β
Ezt−1 [‖∇F (xt)‖2].
(2)
Let rt = ‖xt − x∗‖ be the solution error at step t. We have the following inequalities between rt+1 and rt.
r2t+1 = ‖xt − η∇F (xt)− ηzt − x∗‖2 ,
= ‖xt − x∗‖2 − 2η〈∇F (xt) + zt,xt − x∗〉+ η2 ‖∇F (xt) + zt‖2 .
(3)
Take expectation with respect to zt, we have
Ezt [r
2
t+1] ≤ ‖xt − x∗‖2 − 2η〈∇F (xt) ,xt − x∗〉+ η2 ‖∇F (xt)‖2 + pη2σ2t . (4)
Further take expectation with respect to zt−1 and use Eq 2, we have
Ezt,zt−1 [r
2
t+1] ≤ Ezt−1 [‖xt − x∗‖2]− 2ηEzt−1 [〈∇F (xt) ,xt − x∗〉] + η2Ezt−1 [‖∇F (xt)‖2] + pη2σ2t ,
≤ (1− 2 (1− θ) ην)Ezt−1 [r2t ] +
(
η2 − 2ηθ
β
)
Ezt−1 [‖∇F (xt)‖2] + pη2σ2t .
(5)
Set θ = 1
2
and η ≤ 1
β
,
Ezt,zt−1 [r
2
t+1] ≤ (1− ην)Ezt−1 [r2t ] + pη2σ2t . (6)
Applying Eq (6) and taking expectation with respect to zt,zt−1, · · · ,z1 iteratively yields
E[r2t+1] ≤ (1− ην)t r21 + pη2
t∑
i=1
(1− ην)t−i σ2i . (7)
Uniform privacy budget allocation scheme sets
σ2t = Θ
(
TL2 log(1/δ)
n22
)
.
Therefore
E[r2T+1] ≤ (1− ην)T r21 + Θ
(
pηTL2 log(1/δ)
νn22
)
. (8)
Set T ≥ 2 log(n)
ην
, we have
(1− ην)T r21 = exp
(
log(1− ην) log(n2)
ην
)
r21 = exp
(
log(1/n2)
1
ην
log(1 +
ην
1− ην )
)
r21,
≤
(
1
n2
) 1
ην
log(1+ ην
1−ην )
r21 <
r21
n2
.
(9)
Last inequality holds because 1
ην
log(1 + ην
1−ην ) > 1 for
1
ην
≥ β
ν
≥ 1.
Therefore, for T ≥ 2 log(n)
ην
, we have the excepted solution error E[r2T+1] satisfies
E[r2T+1] = O
(
pηTL2 log(1/δ)
νn22
)
. (10)
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Since F (x) is β-smooth, we have
F (x)− F (x∗) ≤ β
2
‖x− x∗‖2 . (11)
Using Eq (10) and Eq (11), we have the excepted excess risk satisfies
E[F (xT+1)− F (x∗)] = O
(
βpηTL2 log(1/δ)
νn22
)
for T ≥ 2 log(n)
ην
. The utility bound is minimized when T = 2 log(n)
ην
.
Proof of Theorem 2. The smooth condition gives us,
F (xt+1) ≤ F (xt) + 〈∇F (xt),xt+1 − xt〉+ β
2
‖xt+1 − xt‖2
= F (xt)− η〈∇F (xt),∇F (xt) + zt〉+ βη
2
2
‖∇F (xt) + zt‖2 .
(12)
Take expectation with respect to zt and substitute η = 1β ,
Ezt [F (xt+1)] = F (xt)−
1
2β
‖∇F (xt)‖2 + 1
2β
pσ2t . (13)
Subtract F (x∗) on both sides and use convexity,
Ezt [F (xt+1)− F (x∗)] = F (xt)− F (x∗)−
1
2β
‖∇F (xt)‖2 + 1
2β
pσ2t
≤ 〈∇F (xt),xt − x∗〉 − 1
2β
‖∇F (xt)‖2 + 1
2β
pσ2t .
(14)
Substitute∇F (xt) = β(xt − xt+1)− zt,
Ezt [F (xt+1)− F (x∗)] ≤ β〈xt − xt+1,xt − x∗〉 −
1
2β
Ezt [‖β(xt − xt+1)− zt‖2] +
1
2β
pσ2t
= β〈xt − xt+1,xt − x∗〉 − β
2
‖xt − xt+1‖2 − Ezt〈xt+1,zt〉
= β〈xt − xt+1,xt − x∗〉 − β
2
‖xt − xt+1‖2 − Ezt〈xt − η∇F (xt)− ηzt,zt〉
= β〈xt − xt+1,xt − x∗〉 − β
2
‖xt − xt+1‖2 + 1
β
pσ2t
=
β
2
(‖xt − x∗‖2 − ‖xt+1 − x∗‖2) + 1
β
pσ2t .
(15)
Summing over t = 1, . . . , T and take expectation with respect to z1, . . . ,zT ,
T∑
t=1
E[F (xt+1)− F (x∗)] ≤ β
2
‖x1 − x∗‖2 +
T∑
t=1
1
β
pσ2t . (16)
Use convexity,
E[F (x¯)− F (x∗)] ≤ β
2T
‖x1 − x∗‖2 + 1
β
pσ2
≤ β
2T
‖x1 − x∗‖2 + Θ
(
L2pT log(1/δ)
βn22
) (17)
Choose T = nβ√
p
, we have
E[F (x¯)− F (x∗)] = O
(√
pL2 log(1/δ)
n
)
. (18)
Proof of Theorem 3 and 4. We start by giving a useful lemma.
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Lemma 2. Choose ηt = 1νt , the expected solution error of xt in Algorithm 2 for any t > 1 satisfies
E[‖xt − x∗‖2] ≤ 2L
2
(
1 + pσ2
)
tν2
,
Proof of Lemma 2. We have
‖xt+1 − x∗‖2 = ‖xt − ηtgt − ηtzt − x∗‖2
= ‖xt − x∗‖2 − 2ηt〈xt − x∗, gt + zt〉+ η2t ‖gt‖2 − 2η2t 〈gt,zt〉+ η2t ‖zt‖2 .
(19)
Take expectation with respect to perturbation noise zt and uniform sampling, we have
Ezt,it [‖xt+1 − x∗‖2] = Ezt,it [‖xt − ηtgt − ηtzt − x∗‖2]
≤ ‖xt − x∗‖2 − 2ηt〈xt − x∗,∇F (xt)〉+ η2tL2 + pη2tL2σ2.
(20)
Further take expectation to zt−1 and apply Definition 3,
Ezt,zt−1,it [‖xt+1 − x∗‖2] ≤ (1− 2νtηt)Ezt−1 [‖xt − x∗‖2] + η2tL2
(
1 + pσ2
)
≤ (1− 2νηt)Ezt−1 [‖xt − x∗‖2] + η2tL2
(
1 + pσ2
)
.
(21)
Now we use induction to conduct the proof. Substitute ηt = 1tν into Eq 21, we have Lemma 2 hold for t = 2.
Assume E[‖xt − x∗‖2] ≤ 2L
2(1+pσ2)
tν2
holds for t > 2, then
E[‖xt+1 − x∗‖2] ≤
(
1− 2
t
)
E[‖xt − x∗‖2] + L
2
(
1 + pσ2
)
ν2t2
≤
(
1
t
− 2
t2
)
2L2
(
1 + pσ2
)
ν2
+
L2
(
1 + pσ2
)
ν2t2
=
(
2
t
− 3
t2
)
L2
(
1 + pσ2
)
ν2
≤ 2L
2
(
1 + pσ2
)
(t+ 1) ν2
.
(22)
It’s easy to check that Eq 20 holds for arbitrary x rather than x∗. Rearrange Eq 20 and take expectation, we
have
E[〈xt − x,∇F (xt)〉] ≤ E[‖xt − x‖
2]− E[‖xt+1 − x‖2]
2ηt
+
ηtL
2
(
1 + pσ2
)
2
. (23)
Let k be arbitrarily chosen from {1, . . . , bT/2c}. Summing over the last k + 1 iterations and use convexity to
lower bound 〈xt − x,∇F (xt)〉 by F (xt)− F (x),
T∑
t=T−k
E[F (xt)− F (x)] ≤ E[‖xT−k − x‖
2]
2ηT−k
+
1
2
T∑
t=T−k+1
E[‖xt − x‖2]
(
1
nt
− 1
nt−1
)
− E[‖xT+1 − x‖
2]
2ηT
+
L2
(
1 + pσ2
)
2
T∑
t=T−k
ηt.
(24)
Substitute ηt = 1νt and follow the idea in Shamir & Zhang (2013) by choosing x = xT−k, we arrive at
T∑
t=T−k
E[F (xt)− F (xT−k)] ≤ ν
2
T∑
t=T−k+1
E[‖xt − xT−k‖2] + L
2
(
1 + pσ2
)
2ν
T∑
t=T−k
1
t
. (25)
Now we bound E[‖xt − xT−k‖2] for t ≥ T − k,
E[‖xt − xT−k‖2] ≤ 2E[‖xt − x∗‖2] + 2E[‖xT−k − x∗‖2]
≤ 4L
2
(
1 + pσ2
)
ν2
(
1
t
+
1
T − k
)
≤ 8L
2
(
1 + pσ2
)
ν2
(
1
T − k
)
≤ 16L
2
(
1 + pσ2
)
Tν2
.
(26)
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Substitute Eq 26 into Eq 25,
T∑
t=T−k
E[F (xt)− F (xT−k)] ≤ 8kL
2
(
1 + pσ2
)
Tν
+
L2
(
1 + pσ2
)
2ν
T∑
t=T−k
1
t
. (27)
Let Sk = 1k+1
∑T
t=T−k E[F (xt)] be the averaged expected values of the last k+1 iterations. We are interested
in S0 − F (x∗) = E[F (xT )]− F (x∗). Now we derive an inequality between Sk and Sk−1. By definition,
kSk−1 = (k + 1)Sk − E[xT−k]. (28)
Rearrange Eq 27 to upper bound −E[xT−k],
Sk−1 =
k + 1
k
Sk − E[xT−k]
k
≤ k + 1
k
Sk − Sk
k
+
8L2
(
1 + pσ2
)
(k + 1)Tν
+
L2
(
1 + pσ2
)
2k (k + 1) ν
T∑
t=T−k
1
t
≤ Sk + L
2
(
1 + pσ2
)
2ν
(
16
kT
+
1
k (k + 1)
T∑
t=T−k
1
t
)
.
(29)
Summing over k = 1, . . . , k = bT/2c,
S0 ≤ SbT/2c +
L2
(
1 + pσ2
)
2ν
bT/2c∑
k=1
16
kT
+
bT/2c∑
k=1
T∑
t=T−k
1
k (k + 1) t
 . (30)
Now we bound SbT/2c − F (x∗). Choose x = x∗ and ηt = 1tν in Eq 24 ,
T∑
t=dT/2e
E[F (xt)− F (x∗)] = νdT/2eE[
∥∥xdT/2e − x∗∥∥2]
2
+
ν
2
T∑
t=dT/2e+1
E[‖xt − x∗‖2]
+
L2
(
1 + pσ2
)
2
T∑
t=dT/2e
ηt
≤ L
2(1 + pσ2)
ν
(1 +
T∑
t=dT/2e+1
1
t
+
T∑
t=dT/2e
1
2t
)
≤ L
2(1 + pσ2)
ν
(1 +
3
2
T∑
t=dT/2e
1
t
)
≤ 4L
2(1 + pσ2)
ν
.
(31)
The second inequality uses Lemma 2. The last inequality holds because the fact that
∑T
t=dT/2e
1
t
≤ log(2).
Dividing Eq 31 by dT/2e,
SbT/2c − F (x∗) ≤ 8L
2(1 + pσ2)
Tν
. (32)
We have
∑bT/2c
k=1
16
kT
≤ 16(1+log(T ))
T
because it is harmonic sequence. Lastly,
bT/2c∑
k=1
T∑
t=T−k
1
k (k + 1) t
≤
bT/2c∑
k=1
log(2)
k(k + 1)
≤
bT/2c∑
k=1
log(2)
k2
≤ 2 log(2).
(33)
Plugging these bounds into Eq 30, we have
S0 − F (x∗) = O
(
(1 + pσ2)L2 log(T )
Tν
)
. (34)
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Figure 4: Curvatures of regularized logistic regression on KDDCup99 dataset over training. Dot
symbol represents average curvature and cross symbol represents minimum curvature.
Choose σ2 = Θ
(
Tlog(1/δ)
n22
)
to guarantee (, δ)-DP. Set T = n22, we have
S0 − F (x∗) = O
(
pL2 log(n)log (1/δ)
n22ν
)
. (35)
Set T = n√
p
and assume p < n2, we have
S0 − F (x∗) = O
(√
pL2 log(n)
nν
)
. (36)
Appendix B Detailed description on benchmark datasets
Table 3: Detailed description of seven real world datasets.
dataset Adult KDDCup99 MNIST Covertype Gisette Real-sim RCV1
# records 45220 70000 65000 581012 6000 72309 50000
# features 104 114 784 54 5000 20958 47236
# classes 2 2 10 7 2 2 2
Appendix C Comparison between Average and Minimum Curvatures on
Different dataset
In this section we plot the average and minimum curvatures in Figure 4 for another dataset KDDCup99. The
objective function is still regularized logistic regression.
As shown in Figure 4, the average curvature is still larger than the minimum curvature (especially when the
regularization term is small). Despite this, the average curvature of KDDCup99 is smaller than Adult, this may
be the reason why the improvement in Section 4 is larger for the Adult dataset.
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